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The current work tests different theoretical models of belongingness and acceptance
as fundamental needs for human motivation. In the current study, 372 participants
were presented with 52 different items measuring five different theoretical models
of belongingness (with a total of 32 items) and three different theoretical models of
acceptance (with a total of 20 items). In a first step, Confirmatory Factor Analysis
(CFA) failed to provide support for these eight theoretical models. In a second step, we
therefore applied Exploratory Factor Analysis yielding three factors, which we interpreted
as communicating: (1) Belongingness, (2) Emotion-Acceptance, and (3) Social Self-
Representation. In a third step, these three factors were corroborated by a CFA. We
discuss how these two factors of “belongingness,” “emotion-acceptance” respond to
the literature on the need to belong and be accepted, and we reflect on how ‘social
self-representation’ seems to be an alternative motivation for how we present ourselves
to our social relations to fulfill our needs.
Keywords: belongingness, acceptance, social, self, representation, needs, EFA, CFA
INTRODUCTION
“You see us as you want to see us – in the simplest terms, in the most convenient definitions. But what we
found out is that each one of us is a brain . . . an athlete . . . a basket case . . . a princess and a criminal. . .”
– “The Breakfast Club” by John Hughes
This infamous 80s movie tells a story about five strangers forced to be in detention and have
centered the belief of who they are around how they belong, are accepted, and how their self is
socially presented. Based on social interactions with one another during detention, they were able to
see themselves, not for how they are socially presented, but for who they truly are: as fellow human
beings with a burning need for belongingness and acceptance fulfilled through their friendships. It
is this realization of social connectedness motivating Brian’s declaration of the group as the “The
Breakfast Club.”
As illustrated by the movie, the need to belong (e.g., Baumeister and Leary, 1995) and the
need for acceptance (e.g., Rogers and Koch, 1959; Rogers, 1961) make up two essential parts
of what it means to be oneself in response to our social relations (Cohen and Syme, 1985;
Hagerty and Patusky, 1995; Leary et al., 2006; Leary and Cox, 2008). Despite the longstanding
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influence that the concepts of belongingness and acceptance
have had on psychological thinking (e.g., Murray, 1938; Maslow,
1943, 1968; Rogers, 1951; McClelland, 1987; Deci and Ryan,
1991; Goodenow, 1993; Ryan, 1993; Vallerand, 1997) one should
have expected an agreement on what “belongingness” and
“acceptance” mean. Yet, there is no shared agreement on what
is meant with “belongingness” (see Maslow, 1962; Thoits, 1982;
Hagerty and Patusky, 1995) and “acceptance” (see Rogers, 1961;
Greenberg, 1994; Cialdini and Goldstein, 2004) as each of the
two constructs are defined differently depending on who you ask.
By such, both “belongingness” and “acceptance” are presented as
having different variations wowed within them. If this is true, one
should expect that it should be possible to (1) differentiate among
all the different variations of “belongingness” and “acceptance.”
Alternatively, if they can’t be differentiated, we believe it should
be possible to (2) demonstrate their shared similarities; that all
definitions of “acceptance” and “belongingness” are universal and
undifferentiated regardless of theoretical standpoint. However,
if it should not be possible to differentiate them or find them
to be so similar that they can form two distinct, but related
constructs, we need to explore and re-think what “belonging”
and “acceptance” means for theoreticians and researchers. With
these ideas in mind, we followed Gausel et al.’s (2012) and Gausel
et al.’s (2016) approach to “scale validation” using Confirmatory
Factor Analysis (CFA).
TWO PSYCHOLOGICAL NEEDS FOR
HUMAN MOTIVATION: BELONGINGNESS
AND ACCEPTANCE
The evaluation of the need to belong and the need for acceptance
is largely judged in relation with one’s emotional bond with
another (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Shah, 2003). The degree
of subjectively appraised need-fulfilment has a great impact
on one’s psychological well-being, motivation, and functioning
(e.g., Bowlby, 1969, 1973; Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Murphy
et al., 2007; Cheryan et al., 2009). If the needs are fulfilled,
they positively influence how people appraise themselves, how
they feel about themselves and how they behave, (Gausel and
Leach, 2011) and thus, contribute to a subjective sense of social
connectedness with others (e.g., Rogers, 1951; McClelland, 1987;
Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Vallerand, 1997) and better well-
being (e.g., Cohen and Janicki-Deverts, 2009). Yet, if these needs
are appraised as deprived or unfulfilled, a feeling of rejection is
felt (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Gausel and Leach, 2011) leading
to a sense of worthlessness (Tangney and Dearing, 2002) and
depression (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Hagerty and Patusky,
1995). However, as these needs are fulfilled through our social
bonds, the way we present ourselves socially to others (Ellemers
et al., 2008) is an important aspect of how we balance our needs
to belong and to be accepted up against the desired view of
one’s social-image in the eyes of others (Gausel and Leach, 2011;
Gausel, 2013).
As the two needs seem to incorporate various aspects of
the way the self is functioning and develops, many different
theoretical models of what “belonging,” and “acceptance” mean
have evolved consequently. In our reading, we were able to detect
what seemed to encompass at least five theoretical models of
“belongingness” and three theoretical models of “acceptance.”
For “belongingness” we identified a sense of “identity-proximity”
(e.g., Kohut, 1971, 1977; Kohut et al., 1984), a sense of “emotion-
sharing” (e.g., Lee and Robbins, 1995), a sense of “supportive-
proximity” (e.g., Hill, 1987; Lazarus, 1991; Kelly and Barsade,
2001; Pickett et al., 2004), a sense of “similarities of Self and
Others” (e.g., Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999), and a sense
of “environmental-satisfaction” (e.g., Bronfenbrenner’s, 1979).
For “acceptance,” we identified a sense of “usefulness” (e.g.,
Rogers and Koch, 1959), a sense of “satisfactory” (e.g., Hayes,
1994), and a sense of “attitude to change” (e.g., Vygotsky, 1978;
Bandura, 1986; Linehan, 1993; Heard and Linehan, 1994). In the




Identity Through Proximity With the
“Other”
According to Kohut (1971, 1977) and Kohut et al. (1984), there
cannot be a cohesive self without someone else in proximity
to mirror oneself in. That is, the “other” in the relationship
provides a platform where one’s value can be mirrored, one
can reciprocally be liked and by such experience a sense of
connectedness and alikeness with the “other.” In this way, the
experience of responses from the “other” is what reinstates
and encapsulates the experiences of self and give rise to
the emergence of self-identification in proximity with “the
other.” Similarly, Baumeister and Leary (1995) argued that the
subjective experience of oneself is experienced through one’s
social relationship, where these relationships maintain a certain
measure of belongingness depending on its proximal distance
from oneself. Any shortcomings or failures can by such threaten
one’s relationships, which in turn will threaten the need to belong,
ultimately leading to severe feelings of isolation and alienation
(Gausel and Leach, 2011), anxiety and depression (Baumeister
and Leary, 1995; MacDonald and Leary, 2005). What we term
“identity-proximity” is, therefore the understanding of one’s
identity through the need to belong fulfilled via affiliation and
relationship with the proximal “other.”
Emotion-Sharing – Reciprocal
Connectedness
It is theorized that the need to belong involves the psychological
experience of social connectedness obtained through emotion
sharing. According to Lee and Robbins (1995), a sense
of belongingness evolves from infancy to maturity through
companionship, affiliation, and connectedness. Despite not being
able to empirically confirm this three-parted argumentation they
convincingly argued that one’s need to belong is growingly
associated with a sense of worth obtained through, not only
caregivers, but also through affiliations with others, and later,
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relationships outside their comfort circle. The joint theme for
their argumentation is that the need to belong in these stages
are marked by the ability to reciprocally share emotions and
thus experience mature connectedness. By such, Lee and Robbins
(1995) argued that the need to belong is fulfilled through
emotion-sharing and reciprocal connectedness.
Supportive-Proximity – Emotional
Support From Others
Lazarus (1991) proposed that people appraise stressful situations
based on whether they think they have the resources to cope
with the stressors or not. One of the key coping strategies in
relation to social stressors is to check whether they have social
resources needed to cope. Therefore, in the face of a stressor,
people typically reach out to their social relations to receive
emotional support. By such, appraising stressful situations should
elicit one’s sense of belonging (or the need to reach out for
emotional support) beyond significant others in order to re-
appraise the stressor based on the emotional support one receives
from whomever close enough to be offering support. Hill (1987)
therefore theorized that one’s social affiliation motive can be
structured on the aim for continuous emotional support, as
one’s need for belongingness is sensitize based on the subjective
experiences and cues (Kelly and Barsade, 2001; Pickett et al.,
2004). The need to belong can therefore be understood as a need
oriented toward emotional support from proximal others.
Similarity of Self and Others – Social
Identity
According to social-identity theory, understanding who one is, is
affected by how we identify with similar others (Tajfel and Turner,
1979). According to Turner (1999), self-categorization becomes
fully operational as a social identity only once an individual has
identified with her/his social category. By such, one’s worth is
influenced by the number of possible social groups in which one
belongs. If belongingness has been obtained through allocation
with a group of similar others, one will prioritize one’s group
simply because oneself is a belonging member of that group.
Thus, the need to belong is created through a cognitive process
where one’s self-worth is dependent on a similarity of Self and
Others’ as represented by a group-membership (Tajfel, 1978;
Turner et al., 1987).
Environmental-Satisfaction –
Interactions and Experiences
A sense of belonging is attached to the influences of the
environment one is interacting with. Bronfenbrenner’s (1979)
ecological framework posits that human experiences and
development tie themselves to the interactions of individuals and
the events of their environment as satisfactory or unsatisfactory.
Thus, belongingness based on “environmental-satisfaction” is
interconnected to how one centers or attaches oneself with the
overall satisfaction of an experience within their environment.
This consequently motivates one’s need for participation and
the influence of self-perception of belongingness, as this feeling
of emotional connection within a setting can accordingly result
in the feeling of rejection if unsatisfactory, or belonging if




Rogers and Koch (1959) posits that there is an inherent need for
acceptance to feel useful for others, that is, that there is a use
for me in the world. Rogers connects this usefulness to the need
for acceptance as a way to self-actualize, or to become a “fully
functioning person” (p. 208). This actualizing tendency, where
acceptance feeds individuals toward an evaluative process of
appraised usefulness and worthiness, is a prerequisite to personal
growth in Rogers’ eyes. The driving force behind this type of
acceptance is the emphasis on how “useful” an individual feels
in response to one’s self-actualizing tendency. As the need for
acceptance is inherent to self-actualization, the experience of
acceptance from others as ‘useful’, demonstrates a fulfilment of
the need for acceptance. By ideal, this perception of oneself as
“useful” is then consistent with the self-representation of the
ideal-self, and accordingly creates a state of congruency toward a
fully functioning, and accepted person (Rogers and Koch, 1959).
Satisfactory
Hayes (1994) illustrates acceptance to be “experiencing events
fully and without defense” (p. 30). By such, he suggests that
regardless of the events being positive or negative the experience
itself embraced without defense should be satisfying the need for
acceptance. Naturally, in contrast to an unwanted experience and
feeling toward the self in a social interaction, people are typically
inclined to be more satisfied and more content based on a positive
social interactions and relationships (e.g., Deci and Ryan, 2002;
Nguyen et al., 2016). Nevertheless, the need for acceptance, and
its fulfilment, according to Hayes (1994) should create a feeling of
self-satisfaction when one relates to events in one’s life without a
defensive stance.
Attitude to Change
One’s attitude to change in relation to feedback from our social
relations can form a basis for the fulfilment of the need to
be accepted. For instance, when there is a lack of acceptance
communicated, it will effectively influence one’s “attitude to
change” to the point that if change is not initiated acceptance
will be withdrawn and the need will go unfulfilled (Gausel,
2013). Indeed, it is only natural that the experience of not
receiving acceptance from others will support one’s “attitude to
change.” That said, a strong alternative to lack of acceptance as
a motivator for change is unconditional acceptance (Rogers and
Koch, 1959). This will also spur one’s attitude to change, especially
in therapeutic engagement (e.g., Rogers and Koch, 1959; Linehan,
1994). Taken together, the need for acceptance and the attitude to
change are focusing on interactions in everyday life, highlighting
how the casual attribution of acceptance affects one’s ‘attitude
to change’ to satisfy the need for acceptance (Vygotsky, 1978;
Mccormick and Martinko, 2004; Betz, 2007).
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THE CURRENT STUDY
The goal of the current study was to test whether it was possible
to differentiate among the five variations of belongingness and
three variations of acceptance as we have suggested. However,
if this is not feasible, we believe it should still be possible to
tap into their shared similarities so that the eight variations
reflect two larger “umbrella constructs” where one would be
reflecting a global “belongingness” factor (incorporating the five
variations of belonging), and the other a global “acceptance”
factor (incorporating the three variations of acceptance). To
investigate and test these two hypotheses, we followed Gausel
et al. (2012, 2016) approach to “scale validation” performing
various steps using CFA.
METHOD
Participants and Procedure
Three hundred eighty-seven English speaking community
participants from 51 different nationalities (where English was
the de facto and the de jure language for 15 of them) across the
world were originally invited to a voluntary online survey titled
“Social Relations” using Google forms. Out of these participants,
15 cases were deleted due to missing data of gender and
nationality, making the final sample a total of 372 (229 women
and 143 men, Mage = 38.39, SD = 12.27, age-range = 18–79).
Participants were first presented with information regarding
the purpose of the study and the nature of their involvement
as voluntary. Following this, they were reassured participation
was completely anonymous, and that no information could
be traced back to them. Participants were informed that the
study contained statements about their thoughts toward being
social and that there were no right or wrong answers, and
that completion of the study was calculated to be around
10 min. Following this, participants were asked to fill in their
demographics as reported above (i.e., gender, age, nationality)
and then went on to respond to the 52 items developed to be
representative of belongingness and acceptance.
Measures
Five Variations of “belongingness”
Drawing on the framework as described in the introduction, 32
items were developed for this study to reflect the five variations
of ‘belongingness’. (1) Identity-Proximity (five items α = 90,
M = 5.36, SD = 1.17) “I feel that people listen to me,” “I feel like
I can be myself,” “I feel that I am valued by others,” “I feel that
I was recognised by others,” and “I feel respected by others.” (2)
Emotion-Sharing (seven items α = 80, M = 5.24, SD = 0.75) “I
have a need to belong,” “I feel the need to belong with others,”
“I feel other people affect my behavior,” “I feel I am involved
with other people,” “I feel close to other people,” “People need
to feel that they belong,” and “I feel I can talk to people.” (3)
Supportive-Proximity (six items α = 83, M = 5.99, SD = 0.19)
“I feel it is important that people can come and share with me,”
“It is important that people can come to me for help,” “I feel it
is important that I can share with others,” “I feel is important
that I can turn to people for help,” “I think it is important that
people can trust me,” and “I think it is important that I can trust
in people,” (4) Similarity of Self and Others (four items α = 90,
M = 5.16, SD = 1.29) “I feel I am part of other,” “I feel I am
recognised by others,” “I feel that I am important to others,”
and “I feel I am acknowledged by others.” (5) Environmental-
Satisfaction (ten items α = 79, M = 5.28, SD = 0.53) “ I feel
safe when I am with others,” “I find opportunities within the
situation I am in,” “I feel comfortable within the place I am in,”
“ It is important for me to feel part of others,” “It is important
that I feel part of the situation,” “ I feel it is important that I feel
belongingness where I am,” “ It is important that in the situation
I can depend on people,” “ It is important that I am not being
compared by others,” “I feel that I can work together with people,”
and “It is important that I can share my ideas openly.”
Three Variations of “Acceptance”
Similarly, 20 items were developed in reflection to the three
variations of “acceptance.” (1) Usefulness (five items α = 85,
M = 4.99, SD = 0.99) “I feel that I am in control of my life,”
“I feel emotionally connected to others,” “I feel connected to
others,” “I get what I want emotionally from others,” and “I feel
that people know who I am.” (2) Satisfactory (five items α = 65,
M = 4.86, SD = 0.97) “I feel that I need to convince people
about myself,” “I feel that I get positive feedback from others,” “I
feel that I can be myself around people,” “I feel that I can show
my emotions to others,” and “I feel I am allowed to express my
emotions around others.” (3) Attitude (ten items α = 56, M = 4.66,
SD = 0.56) “I feel that people listen to me,” “I feel I am safe,” “I
feel I am useless,” “It is important that I often get good feedback,”
“I would like for people to respect me more,” “I feel better when
someone compliments me,” “I would like to feel good in response
to others,” “It is important for people to see me the way I see
myself,” “I feel that others are as much as worth as I am,” and
“I actively look to fit in with others.” All 52 items were anchored
with a seven-point intensity scale (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
RESULTS
Testing the Hypothesized 5 + 3
Structure: Confirmatory Factor Analysis
With the use of AMOS 26 from IBM, we examined the
hypothesized eight-factor structure (5 belongingness factors + 3
acceptance factors) with a CFA. Missing data within the
questionnaire was handled using “Estimate means and intercepts”
allowing for maximum-likelihood (ML) estimation (as little as 49
items of total of 19344 responses was left unanswered equaling
0.25%). No sample simulation was used. A variety of criteria and
fit indices were considered to assess the model fit: Comparative
Fit Index (CFI) > 0.90 adequate fit (see Bentler, 1990; Hu and
Bentler, 1999; Schreiber et al., 2006), Incremental Fit Index
(IFI) > 0.90 acceptable fit (Bentler and Bonett, 1980). In terms
of Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RMSEA) cut-
off values.05 and.08 are acceptable and values between 0.08 and
0.1 are marginal (Browne and Cudeck, 1993; Fabrigar et al.,
1999), and a p-value of <0.05. for χ2 (Hu and Bentler, 1999;
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Mehmetoglu and Jakobsen, 2016). In line with the scale validation
recommendations by Gausel et al. (2012, 2016), we allowed
each of the eight factors to correlate, but no correlations were
allowed between the error terms. To our disappointment, this
model fit the data poorly as yielded by a significant chi-square,
χ2 (1246) = 4827.1, p < 0.000, (χ2/df = 3.87), a very low
Comparative Fit Index: CFI = 0.698, a very low Incremental Fit
Index: IFI = 0.702, but a relatively good Root Mean Square Error
of Approximation, RMSEA = 0.088, with a Akaike information
criterion index (AIC) of 5195.09. Although the isolated RMSEA
value was decent, it did not conform with the other (very poor)
fit indices and could therefore not be used as an overall indication
of good fit (Kline, 1998; Hu and Bentler, 1999). Moreover, factor
loadings ranged from λ = −0.83, p < 0.001–0.93, p < 0.001.
indicating that the factors were poorly defined by their respective
items (Gausel et al., 2012, 2016), with very high correlations
between the eight different factors (ranging from r = −0.87,
p = 0.012, to r = 0.97, p < 0.001) Due to the poor fit of the
data, we must admit that we failed to receive support for our
first hypothesis.
Our second hypothesis was based on the thinking that
it should be possible to tap into the shared similarities of
all the belongingness items so that they reflected a global
“belongingness” factor (incorporating the five variations of
belong), and the shared similarities of all the acceptance items
so they reflected a global “acceptance” factor (incorporating the
three variations of acceptance). As with the first model, we
allowed the two factors to correlate, but no correlations were
allowed between the error terms. However, as with the first
model, this model fit the data poorly, χ2 (1273) = 6214.08,
p < 0.001, = (χ2/df = 4.88), CFI = 0.584, IFI = 0.587,
RMSEA = 0.102, AIC = 6532.08. Moreover, the difference in
1 AIC = 1336.99 for this model as compared to the first model
demonstrated that this latter model fit the data much worse than
the original model. This conclusion was supported by the 1χ2
(27) = 1386.98, p < 0.001, as well. By such, we must admit that we
failed to receive support for our second hypothesis.
With the two failed models, we now decided to follow a third
recommendation by Gausel et al. (2012, 2016) where all items
collapse onto one factor. Hence, all 52 items were collapsed into
a big, global “social need” factor. However, this solution did not
fit the data either, χ2 (1274) = 6321.4, p < 0.001, (χ2/df = 4.96),
CFI = 0.575, IFI = 0.578, RMSEA = 0.103, AIC = 6635.39. In
fact, this model fit the data even worse than both, the first
(1 AIC = 1440.30, 1χ2 (28) = 1494,30, p < 0.001) and the second
model (1 AIC = 103.31, 1χ2 (1) = 107.32, p < 0.001).
Exploring the Data: Exploratory Factor
Analysis
Left with the realization that both hypotheses were not
confirmed, but rather falsified, we saw it necessary to
explore what “belonging” and “acceptance” meant to our
community-participants and what they were trying to
communicate to us. In a second step, we, therefore deployed an
Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) with SPSS 26 from IBM, in
order to non-directionally investigate the relationships among
the variables (Bryman and Cramer, 2005) and by such uncover
the empirically distinct factorial structure of the participants’
responses to the items (Lord et al., 1968; Zhang and Stout, 1999).
Thus, all 52-items were subjected to an EFA with a direct oblimin
rotation. ML estimation was applied due to its advantage of
providing standard errors for factor loadings, and a χ2 fit-indicia
of the overall goodness-of-fit was applied to evaluate the fit of
the extracted factors (Fabrigar et al., 1999; Hayashi et al., 2007).
As a first step, we examined the data in response to the default
setting of Kaiser’s criterion eigenvalue of 1. Results yielded a
significant [χ2 (810) = 1489.12, p < 0.000] 10-factor solution
after 11 iterations with several cross-loadings around 0.40 and
0.50 indicating too high of a correlation between the factors.
By such, the 10 factors did not communicate any meaningful
pattern of information to us thus, so we disregarded this initial
factor solution.
In a second step, we decided to examine more closely
the associated scree plot (Preacher and MacCallum, 2003).
This visual information suggested that three factors should be
retained. We, therefore, removed the most notorious cross-
loadings and ran the EFA again, this time instructing SPSS to
extract three factors. This move provided 11 items under three
factors after 22 iterations where the sum of squared loadings
ranged from 0.372 to 0.937 (see Table 1 for all loadings). Even
though the factorial solution was significant, χ2 (25) = 75.58,
p < 0.000, all three factors meet the Kaiser’s criterion of
eigenvalues greater than 1, and the three-parted factorial solution
TABLE 1 | EFA three-factors.
Item Factor
1 2 3
Q7 I fed the need to belong with 0.937 −0.244 −0.037
other
Q6 I have a need to belong 0.799 −0.248 −0.004
Q26 It is important for me to 0.626 −026 0.127
feel part of others
Q42 I feel I am allowed to 0.414 0.816 0.097
express my emotion around
others
Q41 I feel that I can show my 0.414 0.746 0.160
emotion to others
Q36 I get what I want 0.355 0.595 −0.094
emotionally from others
Q40 I feel that I can be myself 0.407 0.595 −0.014
around people
Q47 I would like for people to −0.024 −0.393 0.589
respect me more
Q45 I feel that I am useless −0.064 −0.368 0.504
Q38 I feel that I need to 0.084 −0.351 0.422
convince people about myself
Q30 it is important that I am not 0.050 −0.101 0.372
being compared with others
Extraction method: maximum likehood, Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser
normalization, loading larger than 0.30 are in bold.
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accounted for in total of 65.58% of the variance. Factor 1 had
an eigenvalue of 3.60 and accounted for 32.77% of the variance.
Factor 2 had an eigenvalue of 2.37 and accounted for a variance
of 21.53%. Factor 3 had an eigenvalue of 1.24 and accounted for
11.28% of the variance.
According to Karagoz and Kosterelioglu (2008), labeling
factors discovered from factor analysis is rightly challenging,
and the use of strongest factor loading can therefore guide us
toward a conceptual understanding, allowing us to create an
encapsulating, meaningful label for each factor. Factor 1, with its
three items, was oriented toward a need to belong and being a
part off others, thus, we thought this factor was best labeled as
“Belongingness” (α = 0.83): “I feel the need to belong with others,”
“I have a need to belong,” and “It is important for me to feel part
of others.” Factor 2, communicated a sense of acceptance through
being allowed to express and show ones emotions around others,
thus we labeled this factor, with its four items, as “Emotion-
Acceptance” (α = 0.87): “I feel that I can be myself around people,”
“I feel that I can show my emotions to others,” “I feel I am allowed
to express my emotions around others,” and “I get what I want
emotionally from others.” Factor 3, listed four items reflecting
a value-based need to represent oneself in response to one’s
social environment, hence, we labeled this factor “Social Self-
Representation” (α = 0.64): “It is important that I am not being
compared with others,” “I feel that I need to convince people
about myself,” “I feel that I am useless,” and “I would like for
people to respect me more.”
Confirmatory Factor Analysis Again:
Testing the Newfound 3-Factorial
Structure
As the results from the EFA suggested three factors, we followed
the recommendations of van Prooijen and van der Kloot (2001)
to test whether it was possible to replicate, and thus cross-
validate, the newfound three-factorial structure with a CFA. If the
factorial structure suggested by the exploratory approach was a
sensible one, one should expect the factorial structure “to hold”
within the same dataset when trying to confirm the factorial
structure communicated by the participants in the EFA (e.g., van
Prooijen and van der Kloot, 2001; Schmitt, 2011; Toyama and
Yamada, 2012). Again, we followed the recommendations for
scale-validation as suggested by Gausel et al. (2012, 2016).
We performed a CFA with AMOS 26 from IBM to examine the
three newly generated factors. Again, the missing data within the
questionnaire was handled using "Estimate means and intercepts”
allowing for ML estimation. No sample simulation was used. All
three factors were allowed to correlate and correlations between
error terms were not allowed to correlate. As before, we used
the same fit indices and criterion to determine the goodness-of-
fit of the model. As shown in Figure 1, the three-factors model
confirmed that each item loading measures within limits and
with significance of.30. Even though the χ2 was significant χ2
(41) = 143.78, p = 0.000, the χ2/df of 3.51 was within the range
of acceptable (e.g., Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1993; Wan, 2002; Kline,
2005). Moreover, the other fit-indices such as the CFI = 0.937, the
IFI = 0.938, and the RMSEA = 0.082, all indicated an acceptable
to good fit of the model (e.g., Bentler and Bonett, 1980; Bentler,
1990; Fabrigar et al., 1999; Schumacker and Lomax, 2010) with
an AIC of 215.78. Factor loadings ranged from λ = 0.33 to 0.98,
and M = 0.71 indicating that the factors were well defined by their
respective items (Gausel et al., 2012, 2016), with low to moderate
correlations between the three different factors (ranging from
r = −0.41, p = 0.001, to r = 0.23, p < 0.001). By such, we
concluded that the exploratory factorial solution was replicated
and validated with a CFA (see Table 2 for means, standard
deviations, and correlations).
The next steps in the scale validation procedure (Gausel
et al., 2012, 2016) was to test the three-factorial structure up
against other possible alternatives. First, we tested it up against
a model where we allowed all the “Belongingness” items and all
the “Social Self-Representation” items to load onto one factor,
while the items of “Emotion-Acceptance” loaded onto a second
factor. This model fit the data much worse than the three-
factorial model (1 AIC = 228.363, 1χ2 (2) = 232.36, p < 0.000).
Second, we tested the three-factorial structure up against a model
where all items of “Belongingness” and “Emotion-Acceptance”
loaded onto one factor, and “Social Self-Representation” items
loaded onto a second factor. Again, this model fit much
worse than the three-factorial model (1 AIC = 504.184, 1χ2
(2) = 508.18, p < 0.000). Third, we tested the three-factorial
structure up against a model where all items of “Emotion-
Acceptance” and “Social Self-Representation” loaded onto one
factor, while the “Belongingness” items loaded onto a second
factor. Again, this model fit much worse than the three-factorial
model (1 AIC = 153.537, 1χ2 (2) = 157.537, p < 0.000). Finally,
we tested the three-factorial structure up against a model where
all items loaded onto one global factor. Like before, this model fit
much worse than the three-factorial model (1 AIC = 6439.276,
1χ2 (2) = 6201.28, p < 0.000).
Correlational Analyses of the Three
Constructs
Looking at the correlations, there was a significant positive
relationship between ‘belongingness’ and ‘emotion-acceptance’,
r = 0.29, p < 0.001, such that the more belongingness needed,
the more emotion-acceptance was needed, and vice versa.
There was a weak, but significant, positive relationship between
“belongingness” and “social self-representation,” r = 0.11,
p = 0.034., such that the greater the need for belongingness, the
greater the need to socially self-represent, and vice versa. Finally,
there was a significant, negative relationship between “emotion-
acceptance” and “social self-representation,” r =−0.31, p < 0.001,
such that the greater the need for emotion acceptance, the less of
a need to socially self-represent.
DISCUSSION
The goal of the current study was to test whether we were
able to identify five variations of belongingness and 3 variations
of acceptance. Somewhat to our disappointment, we realized
that the 8 variations proposed were simply not possible to
confirm. Using the approach to “scale validation” as suggested
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 6 January 2021 | Volume 11 | Article 604090
fpsyg-11-604090 January 12, 2021 Time: 16:26 # 7
Pardede et al. Testing Different Theoretical Models of Belongingness and Acceptance
FIGURE 1 | Three-factors model of Belongingness, emotion-acceptance, and Social Self-Representation, Emotional-Acceptance, and Social Self-Representation.
by Gausel et al. (2012, 2016), our CFA demonstrated that
the first hypothesis was falsified. This means that the five
variations of belongingness as we were able to identify in
our reading of the literature: “Identity-proximity” (Kohut,
1971, 1977; Kohut et al., 1984), “emotion-sharing” (Lee
and Robbins, 1995), “supportive-proximity” (e.g., Hill, 1987;
Lazarus, 1991), “similarities of self and others” (Tajfel and
Turner, 1979; Turner, 1999), and “environmental-satisfaction”
(Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Bronfenbrenner and Ceci, 1994) were
unsupported. The failure to confirm our hypothesis also meant
that the three variations of “acceptance” in which we identified
as: “Usefulness” (Rogers and Koch, 1959), “satisfactory” (Hayes,
1994), and “attitude to change” (Rogers and Koch, 1959; Linehan,
1993) were also unsupported.
We were also unable to receive support for our second
hypothesis, that there should be enough shared similarities
among the constructs to demonstrate a global “belongingness”
factor (incorporating the five variations of belonging), and a
global “acceptance” factor (incorporating the three variations
of acceptance). By such, the CFA demonstrated that our
second hypothesis, like the first one, was falsified. By such, the
argumentation that there are two different needs, the need for
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Social Self-Representation 0.11 −0.31* –
M 5.08 4.86 3.71
SD 1.26 1.14 1.11
*p < 0.05 (2-tailed).
belongingness and the need for acceptance (e.g., Baumeister
and Leary, 1995; Shah, 2003), was not supported in these
analyses. Nevertheless, the supplementary CFA demonstrated
that belongingness and acceptance could not be made to “fit
into” a unidimensional construct as long as the global “social
need” factor failed to be supported. This latter finding therefore
offers support to Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) argument that
belongingness and acceptance are not the “same thing,” even
though they are both involved in our understanding of oneself
in relation to our social relationships, and it opens up for the
reasoning of Lee and Robbins (1995) that the need to belong and
the need for acceptance are elusive.
As we failed to receive support for our hypotheses, we
had to return to a more data-driven approach and reach out
to our participants in order to re-think and explore their
responses through an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA). With
this approach, three meaningful factors emerged in which we
termed: “belongingness,” “emotion-acceptance,” and “social self-
representation.” In regard of “belongingness,” the three items
that made up this factor clearly tapped into the internal need to
belong and the importance to feel part of others. This first factor
therefore supports Kohut’s (1971, 1977), Kohut et al.’s (1984)
view that there is an internal motivation, a drive to be needing
“the other” in order to mirror oneself and to feel connectedness
and alikeness in being part with the “other.” This factor also
supports Lee and Robbins (1995), and Baumeister and Leary’s
(1995) argumentation that the need to belong is fulfilled through
reciprocal connectedness in relation to one’s social relationship.
A similar view of the “belongingness” factor emerging from
the EFA can be found in Brewer (1991) and Fiske’s’ (2004)
theories, where the realization on one’s self-concept in terms
of belongingness can only be meaningfully interpreted with
reference to one’s attachment with social groups. By such, there
is good support in the literature for our interpretation of the first
factor of “belongingness.”
The second factor, “emotion-acceptance,” with its four items of
being allowed to be oneself and to express one’s emotions around
others, communicated a sense of acceptance focusing on being
allowed to experience and own one’s emotions and to express
them to others. This kind of emotion-acceptance can especially be
found in Hill’s (1987) argumentation that a core motivation for a
human motive is structured on the aim for continuous emotional
support, and in Lazarus’s (1991) view that when people face a
stressor, people typically try to communicate their emotions to
others in order to receive emotional support and “get what they
need” to cope with the stressor. This second factor of “emotion-
acceptance” also lend support to Lee and Robbins (1995) that a
secure development evolves from infancy to maturity through
the ability to reciprocally share emotions. This need to share
emotions and be accepted for one’s emotions bears a strong
resemblance to Rogers and Koch’ (1959), Rogers’ (1961) view
of the therapeutic dynamic between the client and the therapist
where the therapist needs to be fully acceptive of the client’s
emotions in order to allow the client to gain enough courage
and trust to openly express emotions regardless of the emotions
being “proper or not.” Similarly, this second factor lends support
to Hayes (1994) view of acceptance as emotionally experiencing
events openly and without defense regardless of the experiences
being positive or negative. It is this need for acceptance of being
allowed to openly express and show one’s emotions that Rogers
and Koch (1959); Rogers (1961), and Linehan (1994) theorize as
the keyways for the client to feel useful and to experience worth.
In conclusion, there is much support in the literature for our
interpretation of the second factor of “emotion-acceptance.”
The third factor, “social self-representation,” provided four
items reflecting a value-based need to represent oneself socially
as a person of worth in order to gain respect and to
avoid being compared with others. This need for social self-
representation illustrates a more complex interconnection and
participation situated in the perspective of social representation
and interactions (Ellemers et al., 2008), where one strives to
present oneself favorably to avoid negative reactions from others
due to social-image concerns (Gausel and Leach, 2011). This
hinge to socially self-represent as someone to be respected and
be worthy helps us construct an inner reality of how we perceive,
feel, and think of ourselves, a process which is dependent on
whether we receive positive or negative social feedback on our
attempts to socially self-represent (Hardin and Higgins, 1996).
In line with this, Leary et al. (2013, p. 3) stated that individuals
that tend to “seek a larger number of relationships, worry about
how they are valued by others, and put a great deal of effort
into sustaining interpersonal relationships.” In support of the
interpretation of this third factor, Cooley (1902) and Kohut
(1971) underline how people try to portray a view of oneself in
the eyes of others as someone to be liked and valued.
As the EFA had presented us with three factors that we were
able to interpret as meaningful, and that we could relate to the
literature, we decided to follow the recommendations of van
Prooijen and van der Kloot (2001) to test whether it was possible
to replicate the factorial solution proposed by the EFA with a
CFA. Indeed, we managed to confirm the three-factorial structure
suggested by the exploratory analysis. This model fit the data
in an acceptable to good way and proved to be superior to
all other alternatives to disentangle another factorial solution.
Moreover, it proved to be superior to a solution where we
collapsed all items onto a “social-need” factor. Like before, this
latter finding supported Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) argument
that belongingness and acceptance cannot be collapsed into
the ‘same thing’.
Looking at the correlations, our result demonstrated that
“belongingness” had a positive relationship with both “emotion-
acceptance” and with “social self-representation.” For its
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relationship with emotion-acceptance, this means that the more
one feels the need to belong, the more one feels the need to be
accepted for one’s emotions and to be allowed to share them
with others. This goes well with Baumeister and Leary’s (1995)
argumentation that these two needs operate in conjunction, and
it supports Lee and Robbins (1995) view that the need to belong is
fulfilled through emotion-sharing and reciprocal connectedness.
For the positive relationship “belongingness” has with “social
self-representation,” it means that these two needs operate
together as well, so that the way one presents oneself socially
must be involved in fulfilling the need for belongingness.
Undoubtfully, if we present ourselves in a way that we think
is socially approved of, there should be greater chance to
secure belonging, instead of social condemnation (Gausel, 2013).
Perhaps therefore, some people go to great lengths to agree with
and follow others, even in destructive and immoral behavior, in
order to feel that they belong and avoid being rejected (e.g., Leary
et al., 2006; Smart Richman and Leary, 2009).
An interesting finding is the negative relationship between
“emotion-acceptance” and “social self-representation,” meaning
that the greater the need to be accepted for one’s emotions, the less
of a need to present oneself in a favorable view in order to receive
respect, and vice versa. This finding seems to indicate that if one
is focused on trying to socially present oneself one cannot be open
about who one is and what one feels, instead, one needs to be alert
of which emotions to communicate (e.g., Hayes, 1994). By such,
it lends support to the differentiation between socially acceptable
emotions and socially unacceptable emotions and consequences
of expressing them (Semin and Manstead, 1982; Meyerson, 1990;
Tamir et al., 2016). Akin to social status (Fiske, 2010), social
self-representation much like self-esteem (Cooley, 1902; Harter,
1993) are mutually in correspond to the positive and negative
experiences that the self encounters with the environment and
with others (e.g., Rogers and Koch, 1959; Rosenberg, 1965, 1979).
Ultimately, not being able to fully be oneself and accepted for it
by holding back on showing who one truly is, can accordingly
result in the feeling of rejection and a risk of losing emotional
connection within a social setting (e.g., Lynch, 1976; Relph, 1976;
Canter, 1977).
POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS
In response to the first and second hypothesis that failed, there
is a plausible chance that the items we especially developed to
reflect these eight variations of belongingness and acceptance
were not representative of the variations we had identified.
After all, we did not approach the theoreticians and asked
them for their guidance in designing items tapping into their
variation of the construct in which we identified – an approach
suggested by Hernández et al. (2020). By such, one might say
that the failed eight factor model, and the failed two factor
model were caused by us developing “improper” items. However,
we are convinced that the developed items represent the three
variations of belongingness, emotion-acceptance and social self-
representation in a meaningful information manner. Another
limitation is the use of the English language. It could be that
our findings are related to some artifact of the English language.
Nevertheless, as long as the need to belong and feel accepted
are theorized to be universal (e.g., Baumeister and Leary, 1995)
there is ground to assume that one should be able to find similar
results in other languages as well. Therefore, further studies can
be examined based on similar items, yet with different languages,
and different samples (e.g., Hernández et al., 2020). Some might
say that a final limitation is our use of EFA and CFA on the
same sample. However, we (and others) respectfully disagree
with this viewpoint as other does as well (e.g., van Prooijen
and van der Kloot, 2001; Schmitt, 2011). In line with this, van
Prooijen and van der Kloot (2001) see it as a critical test of a
factorial structure because if the “CFA cannot confirm results of
EFA on the same data, one cannot expect that CFA will confirm
results of EFA in a different sample or population” (p. 780). The
main reason for this is that a CFA specified on an EFA in the
same dataset operates under different conditions where two of
the clearest differences are that EFA allows cross-loadings while
CFA does not, and CFA provides fit of data, while EFA does
not (Schmitt, 2011; Kline, 2015). Naturally, if the EFA cannot
be replicated within the same sample, then there is less reason
to expect factor replication with different datasets. This means
that if the design and participant-pool are not 100% identical
methodological variance will likely cause a failure of replication
that is not caused by the factorial structure, but caused by
methods, design and different people in the participant pool from
the one study to the other (Fabrigar et al., 1999). It is precisely
due to this dilemma that some suggest randomly splitting the
file in two halves and then do EFA on the one and CFA on
the other (Kline, 2015). However, in our view there is little
reason to expect the two halves to be significantly different from
each other. On the contrary, we believe there to be very good
reason to expect the two halves to be identical as the participant
pool is the same, the method is the same and the design is
the same. Due to this, there is little reason to justify a split
of the file in order to perform the EFA in the one half, then
CFA in the other half under the belief that this is any more
different than doing the same thing on a complete dataset. In
conclusion, we believe our approach to be a sound approach
while acknowledging that there are different views on EFA/CFA
and how to understand a sample (Schmitt, 2011; Kline, 2013,
2015; Smith et al., 2016).
CONCLUSION
In the ‘Breakfast club’, the five strangers interacted with
each other in detention. At first, they presented themselves
to each other socially as someone they hoped the others
would find acceptable. However, as detention went along,
they received a togetherness, a belongingness where each of
the five found themselves to have less of a need to socially
self-represent in an idealized way. Rather, they found the
courage to express their emotions, to show the others who
they really were; as fellow human beings with a burning need
for belongingness and to be accepted based on their real
self, of who they really are, and not a socially presented self.
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It is this realization motivating Brian’s declaration of the group as
the “The Breakfast Club.”
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